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EDITORIAL.
ANNOUNCEMENT.
The report of Committee F of the Institute on Indeterminate
Sentence and Release on Parole which should appear in the present
number, has been delayed. It may be expected in the March issue.
-[Eds.]
THE CONGRESS FOR CRIMINAL ANTHROPOLOGY.
The most important event of recent occurrence in the field of criminology was the meeting of the Seventh International Congress for Criminal Anthropology -at Cologne, October 9th to 13th inclusive.
The session was timely if for no other reason than that several European states are at this time revising their penal codes. Interest in every
scientific problem, therefore, that bears either immediately or remotely
upon our understanding of the criminal and consequently upon the proper
treatment of the anti-social classes is on a high level of intensity. In
his discussion of the preliminary draft of the penal codes of Gernany,
Austria, and Switzerland, M. Enrico Ferr. called especial attention to the
latitude that is allowed to the judge in the trial of one who is accused of
crime. The judges in these foreign states already enjoy liberties in investigating and expressing themselves with respect to the accused which are
altogether unknown in American courts. Not only must the judge be
a jurist, says Professor Ferri, but he ought to be, above all, a psychologist
and sociologist as well.
A free discussion on the first day of certain anthropological data and
of inheritance as a factor in the causation of crime, by Professors Klaatch
of Breslau and Rosenfeld of Miinster, was followed by reports and debates
on the merits of probation and the indeterminate sentence. These discussions supplied by far the most distinctive features of the congress.
M5'[me. Lombroso-Ferrero 'presented a report upon the utility of the probation system among children and its danger in the case of adults. In
this connection Al. Holtgreven called attention to the increase in the
number of crimes in Germany which is in advance of the increase in
population. This he attributed particularly to the defects in education.
It is necessary to dam up the tide of juvenile criminality by having recourse to the conditional sentence, by protective education, and by other
means. At this point Professor Ferri declared that the means by which
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we to-day attempt to reclaim the juvenile delinquent will be employed
by our posterity in the treatment of adult criminals. In the course of
the discussion it was recommended again and again that the child, preferably before he enters school, should be submitted to a mental examination, the results of which should be carefully inscribed in a special
register. It seems to us that at such an early age a careful examination
of the individual's physical development might be of greater significance,
from the point of view of probable degeneracy at any rate, than an examination of the mental status. The idea in the minds of those who
suggested it seems to have been that with such data at hand teachers
would be more able than otherwise to adjust the means at their disposal
to the end of developing desirable forms of conduct.
The indeterminate sentence received a large share of attention. M.
Gleispach, professor of penal law in the University of Prague, was its
great protagonist on the third day of the conference. Professor Thyr6n
said that he considered the indeterminate sentence impracticable in dealing with the normal criminal. The question may be different, however,
as regards the criminal who is on the border line of irresponsibility, for
in his case whatever measure of control may be taken cannot be regarded
as punishment. At this point emphasis was properly brought to bear by
M. Friedman of Budapest upon the idea that the principle of the indeterminate sentence has nothing in common with the idea of expiation.
The principle rests simply up6n the protection of the group. No doubt
the popular mind to-day holdi strongly to the idea of expiation and it
would, therefore, be a considerable risk to introduce, wholesale, into actual
practice our scientific knowledge pertaining to this subject without first
transforming public sentiment, or at any rate without transforming it
slowly as one progresses with the application. Friedman thinks that for
the present we must hold to the rule-determinate punishment and indeterminate measures for the ultimate liberty of the culprit. Furthermore,
in the course of this discussion, M. Aschaffenbnrg contended that in no
case should the administration of the indeterminate sentence permit one
who has not overcome his anti-social instincts to leave his place of imprisonment behind him. In some cases it is .possible that a prisoner
should never be released. 11. Engelen, M. Van Hamel, and M9. Von
Hessert; continued the discussion, in the course of which Professor Engelen, alluding to Aschaffenburg's contention, said that the experience of
the Americans should bring about the rejection of the proposed reform,
for in numerous cases he says, with ample justiflcation, a prisoner is released who is not adapted to normal life and who is, therefore, incorrigible. To this criticism, the obvious counter reply was apparently wanting
at the moment, viz.: that this indicates only the need for mo-e complete
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administrative care. In this connection &M.Von Hamel recommended a
conservative position: the adoption of the principle of conditional liberation as a preparation for the possible future establishment of the indeterminate sentence. By means of conditional liberation we may be able
to determine in a particular case whether the amendment of the delinquent has been attained, provided, of course, that the individual so liberated be not thrown upon the street, but placed in an environment of
such a simple character that he may be able to adapt himself to it. In
all of this Attorney-General Von Eiessert of Darmstadt concurred.
At its conclusion the congress by vote adopted the following theses:
First: "Hardened and professional criminals, recidivists, who present a grave danger to society, must be deprived of their liberty for as
long a time as they are dangerous to the mass. Their liberty should be
as a general rule conditional."
Second: "In the case of criminals whose crimes issue from a lack
of social adaptability, strictly determined punishment should be replaced
by an indeterminate penalty which should be executed according to the
progressive system. The liberty of the criminal should be protected (a)
by the establishment of the maximum penalty; (b) by the composition of
the commission of liberation, the majority of which should be composed
of independent judges."
Finally, acting on the proposition of M. Aschaffenburg, the congress
decided to address to the commission charged with the revision of the
penal code the view that "in the next German penal code conditional
liberation should be treated not by the judicial administration but by a
special commission, of which a physician who has studied psychiatry, and
at least one judge should form a part, and that this commission should
at the same time make tests to the end of determining the possibility of
introducing the indeterminate sentence."
One is impressed with the paucity of discussion of strictly anthropological problems in this congress. The report of Professor Klaatsch
upon the results of his investigations of primitive Australian races, and
that of Rosenfeld on the connection of race and criminality, aroused relatively lfttle discussion. This is, perhaps, to be expected, inasmuch as
these .are relatively highly specialized fields of research.
ROBERT H. G.ULT.

THE LIMITS OF COUNSE1VS LEGITIM1ATE DEFENSE.
Out of the many issues and sensations concentrated in the
McNamara dynamite murder base there arises one emphatic question
which dominates all others for the thoughtful student of our criminal
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procedure. It is this: What are the limits of legitimate defense which
counsel may use for an accused?
If we can answer this we put our finger on one of the marked excesses of our present practice. Theoretically, the accused's counsel acts
to secure a fair trial for his client, and therefore to free the latter if he
is innocent. Practically we know that the, regular criminal practitioner
fights to free his client, guilty or innocent. There is here no discrimination between the rich or the poor offender, the hitherto respectable or
the hitherto under-world man-the iines and Walshes, or the MeNamaras and Ruefs. Their counsel fights to the last ditch. Can the law
and the community afford to permit this? Is there no way of putting
a limit on, it.? For it is surely breaking down our system of criminal
justice. It tends to foster the technicality so much censured. It forces
the State prosecutor to fight equally without scruple. It drives almost
all honorable lawyers out of a field where duty calls them and the community needs them. It is one of the most repulsive features of our
present system.
Is there no relief? Alust we wait for a new generation slowly to
bring a radical change of thought and custom? Will the institution
of a State defender (to oppose the State prosecutor) furnish a speedier
solution? These are troublesome questions which must be answered
before long.
But the MeNamara case has brought out in an emphatic way the
extreme unmorality of the system. It has shown us that even the
atrocity and cold inhumanity of a brutal crime may make no recoil in
this class of criminal defenders. In many classes of crime it is easy to
see that there is some sort of a way for the defender to persuade himself
that he is defending a meritorious cause, even if not a law-abiding man.
This is obvious enough in the everyday cases of weak tempted lads or
of ambitious magnates of finance; a high-minded counsel, for example,
in the Standard Oil case of three years ago was heard by the writer to
express in the most passionate terms his sense of the outrage of that persecution. But here in the McNamara case we have crossed the line of
honest differences of sympathy and prejudice. Whoever did dynamite
the Los Angeles Times building, crowded with human beings, .did a
brutal murder, did he not? Re deliberately killed a score of defenseless beings, under circumstances which have never been regarded as anything but plain murder outside of the tenets of Machiavelli or the Hindu
thugs or Stevenson's dynamiters. 'Now we know who did it. But
Clarence Darrow knew it from the first. His interview published in the
dispatches of December 5 says: ' Wen I took this case last March I

foresaw this plea of guilt."

And yet

HE SPENT
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HUNDRED
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NINETY THOUSAND DOLLARS

of

laboring men's innocent money

TO

SECURE AT ANY COST THE ESCAPE OF MEN WHOM HE KNEW TO BE GUILTY

murder which has been universally
condemned by labor unions and all other classes from the Atlantic to
the Pacific as placing its perpetrators beyond the limit of sympathy or
protection.
Is this what the right of defense by counsel means? If so, then
there .is something rotten in the principle. It is useless to befog the
issue by asking: Mlay not a counsel act for a client whom he believes
to be guilty? Of course he may; the best professional traditions agree'
to that, and no argument for or against it matters here. Nor do we
assume here that Clarence Darrow was privy to the $4,000 bribe to a
juryman; that part would look dark for him if he had the spending of
the money in detail, which perhaps he did not. We do not assume that
the hundred and ninety thousand dollars was used to bribe anybody.
But we do ask whether the counsel's duty and right of securing a fair
trial justifies him in setting himself as systematically and persistently
as the expenditure of two hundred thousand dollars signifies to secure
the acquittal of clients whom he knew from the beginning to be guilty
of the worst crime recognized in law and morality alike. That is our.
question.
We might ask a similar question of the defenders of some of the
trust-law accused-the Standard Oil Company or the Packers, for example, because they, too; are spending hundreds of thousands of dollars
on their defense. But, in the first place, we do not know that their
clients are guilty and that counsel knew it. And, in the second place,
there is at least a section of public opinion which sees no moral or
legal wrong in the class of acts charged against them. And that is why
the McNamara case brings out the issue beyond cavil. "IMurder is
ilfurder," in Theodore Roosevelt's words. And, as the American people
are neither Thugs nor Machiavellis, and therefore all agree with Theodore Roosevelt on that point (if no other), we come back to our
proposition: That Clarence Darrow, acting as counsel under the law,
systematically spent one hundred and ninety thousand dollars to extricate
from justice men whom he knew to be guilty of the most atrocious crime
in the calenditr.
Does our system allow this? How can he defend it? How can he
defend himself ? As we figure it, he must defend himself-or be recognized no longer in the ranks of an honorable profession.
We think the issue had better be threshed out. He is already on
record, voluntarily, in his pamphlet, "Resist Not Evil," with principles
which need defending. And in his published interview of December
OF THIS COARSE, BRUTAL MURDER-a
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6 we find its echoes. "The boys," he said, "are not murderers at heart;
they thought tley were just fighting a battle between capital and labor."
There you have it, the doctrine of the Hindu thugs revived; that murder
is not murder at heart, if you do it on behalf of some cause you believe
in. What the public now needs to know plainly is, whether there is
any lawyer or class of lawyers, now allowed in our courts, who sympathize sincerely with this thug doctrine and will do anything to save
its followers. Let us air this whole issue before public opiniom Let
Clarence Darrow, or any one else who believes it, avow it and defend it.
If our criminal system is being administered today by an appreciable
number of able and intelligent lawyers who hold that view, let us all
know it. Public opinion will then take .a hand and settle the issue. If
it can stand that doctrine, so be it. If the public verdict repudiates it,
then let some measure be taken for eliminating its adherents from the
ranks of the bar, and for making the defense of accused persons an
occupation consistent with self-respect and the service of justice.
JoHN H. WIGIzouE.
JUDICIAL DISCRETION VERSUS LEGISLATION IN DETERAIINING DEFENDANTS SUITABLE FOR PROBATION.
The Illinois adult probation law, which went into effect thiis summer, limits the scope of the system to a relatively small number of
offenses. It does not apply to larceny, embezzlement, burglary or attempted burglary in any place of habitation, violations of municipal
ordinances which are not also violations of state laws, and various other
offenses. A number of states, especially in their original enactments,
have restricted probationary treatment in cases of adults to so-called
first offenders and those convicted of minor offenses. Certain states
have authorized the placing of felons on probation, but have specially
exempted from its benefits those convicted of particular felonies like
rape. The laws of other states, on the other hand, leave the classes of
offenders to whom probation may be allowed, almost wholly to judicial
discretion.
Thus far only a few over twenty states have passed adult probation
laws-fewer than half the number that have authorized th6 use of probation for children. During the next few years a number of states, and
Congress, too, it is hoped, will enact statutes for probation in adult cases.
It is pertinent, therefore, to inquire what should be the policy of future
legislation with reference to restricting the field of probation in cases
of adult offenders.
It is only natural ana proper that the legislators of any state, espe-
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cially in passing their first law for adult probation, should wish to move
cautiously. Efforts at reformation of criminals must not lose sight
of the necessity of social defense. Unless an adequate number of properly
qualified probation officers is appointed, the general use of the probation
system may make probation only another name for leniency. It is important that the granting of probation by the courts should not go faster
than the organization of an efficient machinery for dealing with those
put on probation. After the system is well organized, extreme care
must still be exercised lest harm be done by putting on probation, persons unfit for such treatment. Yet, while conservatism in the use of
probation is essential, it is questionable how far the classes of defendants
permitted to be placed on probation should be determined by statute.
In some of the states where the range of offenders eligible for probation is left largely, if not entirely, to judicial discretion, there has
been an extended and successful experience with adult probation. In
these jurisdictions, the determination as to what person shall be put
under probationary oversight is decided by the courts on the basis not
only of the charges against defendants and their records, but also of their
character and circumstances. (These latter are ascertained for the court,
in advance, through a special investigation of each case by a probation officer.) The experience in these states proves that probation is
especially adapted for "first offenders," who are mentally normal and
whose manner of life and environment are not too negative. It seems also'
to show that persons who have been convicted more than once are often
equally as satisfactory subjects for probation, and in some cases more so,
than are "first offenders"; and, furthermore, that felons frequently' succeed under probation better than do misdemeanants. In other words,
the propriety and wisdom of dealing with offenders through probation
is found to depend only in part upon the nature of their particular
offense and upon their criminal record. Other equally important factors
are their habits, family history, other individual characteristics and surroundings. All these facts can be learned and weighed much better by
the local court than by a state legislature.
The above conclusions are what we might expect if we pause to
consider how uncertain as an index of a person's character his offense
or criminal record is. While, from a legal point, there is a distinction
between a person convicted only once and a person convicted more
than once, there may be little or no difference between them morally.
As has often been remarked, the chief difference may be that the one
has been less successful than the other in escaping arrest. It hardly
seems consonant with social justice or wisdom that a man found guilty
for the first time of an offense, say, drunkenness or petit larceny, may
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receive the advantages of probation, while another man convicted of
a-similar offense for the second time must in every case be fined or sent
to jail, although it ma >appen that of the two men the latter is the more
industrious and less dangerous member of society. As for those convicted of a felony, it may be said that many crimes classed as felonies
differ only slightly, and perhaps only in a technical way, from misdemeanors. A person guilty of a felony, in some instances, may be less
anti-social and easier to deal with than a person addicted to the ha]itual
commission of petty offenses. In other words, the specific offense and
to some extent the record, taken alone, are an insufficient citerion for
judging the fitness o4 persons for probationary treatment.
In saying the foregoing it is recognized that in some parts of the
country local conditions may make it advisable, at least during the
near future, to limit the field of probation by statute. As a general
principle, however, it would seem desirable for the legislatures of the
different states to allow pretty free play to judicial discretion in the
matter of selecting persons to be dealt with by probation.
AaTuR W. TowNE.
TRIAL BY PUBLICATION.
The exploitation of the McNamara case, before legal trial, in the
press of all sorts calls attention to the dangers involved to justice in
such methods. The American people have got into a bad way of condoning such things. Public opinion must learn to repudiate it. The
referendum applied to a criminal trial will lead us to the worst mockeries of justice which Athens or Paris ever exhibited for our scorn.
When .Pilate hesitated he took Christ out on the Temple steps and
asked the mob: "Shall I crucify him ?" And the mob shouted back:
"Crucify him !" That is what it will come to at this pace. The spectacle of the chief detective himself trying the case in a popular magazine
last summer was the most extremne instance of misguided zeal. But it
merely typified the national habit that is forming.
We indorse the sentiments of the following editorial from the
Chicago Record-Herald:
"One lesson of the McNamara cases for the press and people of
the United States is that trial by publication in advance of legal trials
operates against the obtaining of justice. The Record-Herald can
speak frankly on this subject, for it studiously avoids trying to convict
or to acquit anyone accused of crime.
"In many published interviews and articles the McNamaras were
virtually declared guilty or innocent long before the selection of jurors
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at Los Angeles began. Detective Burns convicted them in a magazine;
intemperate defenders of unionism pronounced their arrest and trial the
result of a conspiracy to crush the unions and asserted that they would
be innocent in the eyes of labor even though convicted in court.
"If we are to have civilization we must try cases in the courts, not
in public print. Why did the selection of jurors at Los Angeles drag
along insufferably to anyone desirous that the law should act promptly
as well as justly? Largely because public opinion had been prejudiced
for or against the accused men. Freedom of the press in all essential
respects must be upheld, but it must not become perverted to excuse
such arguments as were made to the public before and during the legal
trial of the McNamaras. In England such practices are forbidden.
Discussion of a case pending in court is punished at once as contempt."
JonN

II. WIGAoRE.

AMERICAN DISRESPECT FOR LAW.
In a recent interview in the New York World, Andrew D. White
is reported as saying, "Ten years ago there were only one hundred and
seventeen murders to the million (in the United States), to-day there are
one hundred and twenty-six. Ten years ago one in every seventy-four
cases was punished, to-day only one in eighty-six meets the penalty prescribed by law." The article then goes on to point out that in Canadaacross an-imaginary line-there are only seven murders to the million
annually. Mlany writers in the pages of this JoumNAL and elsewhere
have in similar ndanner compared our enforcement of the criminal law to
that of England, and generally to our great disadvantage. The Honorable John L. Griffiths, consul-general of the United States to London,
in an article written for the Indianapolis Star last fall made the same
comparison and suggested some remedies with special reference to increasing the dignity of our courts. There seems to be little doubt that
England accomplishes results that we do not.
The pages of magazines and newspapers are full of criticisms and
suggestions for reform. It is the temptation of the critic to ascribe
the whole difficulty to the one weak point which at the particular time
occupies his attention. Realizing fully that the preceding statement may
be applied to the argument which follows, the writer, nevertheless, wishes
to argue that in the multitude of diverse criticisms there is danger of
placing too little s.tress upon one of our greatest weaknessds.
It is not the intention here to deny the force of the criticisms
aimed at our criminal procedure, at the quality of many of our judges,
at the lack of activity of our poorly trained prosecuting officers, at the
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qualifications of our lawyers, or at our cumbersome and rigid system
of courts. In fact it is believed that many of these criticisms are wholly
just. It is desired only to call more particular attention to a defect
which is less tangible, but for that reason none the less important-which
is, indeed, for that very reason all the more difficult to remedy. It
is a defect which legislation cannot reach.
Let us imagine, if we can, that by legislation all the good features
of the English, or any other system suitable to our conditions, were to
be suddenly inaugurated here. In other words, suppose that the
machinery of administering the criminal law were made as perfect
as possible. That of itself would not change the temper and spirit of
the people back of the system. Such a change would aid the prosecuting
officer who wished to enforce the law, but it would scarcely affect the
prosecuting officer who did not care to enforce certain laws, either for
personal or political reasons or because many influential voters did not
wish the particular law enforced. INor would a perfect system of procedure cause a jury, which deliberately wished to bring in a verdict
against the law, to bring in a correct verdict. In other words, in seeking
to reform the law we cannot justly overlook the fact that in too many
cases the police do not want to arrest, the prosecutor does not want to
prosecute, nor the jury to convict. Changes in legal forms will not
cause a change in the heart of the citizen who deliberately disregards
the law.
In an article written sometime ago for the Indianapolis Star, C. C.
Hadley, former judge of the Indiana Appellate Court, argued that a
large portion of the difference between American and British enforcement of the criminal law is to be attributed to the American citizen's
lack of respect for the law. He says, "We are a nation of law-breakers,
petty in most cases it may be true, but, nevertheless, violators of the
law. * * * In some cases these violations are commited unknowingly, some
designedly, some thoughtlessly, but all are traceable to our indifference
and irreverence for enacted rules of conduct." In view of facts known
to any alert observer, can it be denied that the average American citizen
deliberately disregards many laws because they interfere with his desires,
or his business, or with his idea of what is morally right? He does
not seem to feel that law is entitled to obedience merely because it is
law. It is an undeniable fact that laws passed for an entire state are
almost completely disregarded in certain communities, because the people
there do not wish these particular laws to be enforced. In homicide
cases it is clear that many defendants are acquitted in spite of the fact
that evidence of the killing is clear and that the law says the act is
murder. They are acquitted by the jury because the jury, representing
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often the sentiment of the community, believes that a killing is justifiable
in cases where the law says it is not. Mluch of our mob violence is
seemingly due, not to the fact that the mob fears that the prisoner will
not be prosecuted, but to the fact that the mob wishes to gratify its
feelings by taking the enforcement of the law into its own hands, or to
the fact that it feels that a legal hanging is too mild a punishment for
certain offenses.
To many it seems a national menace that so many, of our citizens
should be so lacking in respect for constituted authority. The member
of the mob who violates the law, the business man who disregards laws
regulating the sale or manufacture of products in which he deals, the
juryman who violates his oath and frees a defendant for reasons not
recognized by the law, the saloonkeeper of many communities who seems
to have forgotten that any law concerns him, the political worker, who
for the sake of victory winks at all sorts of illegal practices-all these
are responsible for fostering a growing spirit of defiance to any law
which interferes with the desire of the moment. This feeling among
the people influences the elected officer whose duty it is to enforce the
law. In short, this feeling if allowed to grow will make unworkable
any system of law, no matter how perfect in form, which depends for
its enforcement upon elective prosecutors and judges and upon juries
chosen from the citizenship.
It is not intended here to take up the question of how this evil can
be combatted. Since it is an evil which neither legislation nor education in the ordinary sense can reach, it can easily be seen that the
question of remedy is no easy one. However, it can be remedied, and
forces are already at work which will in time, if encouraged, largely
overcome this great weakness of our citizenship. At any rate it would
seem to be a problem of sufficient importance to demand the serious
thought of any citizen who wishes our institutions to endure.
CHEsTER G. VERNIER.

